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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE
PRESS-OFFICIALS MAY CENSOR SCHOOL-SPONSORED STUDENT
SPEECH IF CENSORSHIP HAS 'VALID EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE.' Ha-
zelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
Journalism students at Hazelwood East High School in Missouri
traditionally advertised the upcoming issue of the school paper by
hanging banners.' An eighteen-square-foot banner in the school cafe-
teria heralded the May 13, 1983, issue of Spectrum for which students
wrote stories about teenage pregnancy, divorce and related issues.2
The stories never appeared in Spectrum, however. Principal Robert
E. Reynolds ordered the newspaper's faculty sponsor to excise the
two pages which featured them.'
The student journalists who produced Spectrum learned of the
censorship when the school distributed a four-page issue instead of
the planned six-page issue.4 The students met with the principal, who
stated that the stories on the two deleted pages were inappropriate,
personal, sensitive, and unsuitable.' Three Spectrum staff members
sued the school district, the principal, the superintendent, and the as-
sistant superintendent in federal court. The students sought injunc-
tions, money damages, and a declaration that the censorship violated
1. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1458 (E.D. Mo. 1985),
rev'd, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1459. The two pages of the newspaper which were censored featured six stories:
(1) the accounts of three anonymous Hazelwood East students about their pregnancies; (2) a
story on the effect of divorce on children; (3) a story based on statistics about teen-age preg-
nancy; (4) a story about a proposed rule to require federally funded clinics to notify parents
when teen-agers seek birth control assistance; (5) a survey of the problems faced by teen-age
marriages; and (6) a survey of reasons why teen-agers run away from home. Id. at 1457.
Principal Reynolds only objected to the first two stories. The principal ordered the deletion of
both pages on which the stories appeared, rather than order changes made in the stories, be-
cause he did not believe there was time to make the changes prior to publication. Id. at 1459.
4. Id. at 1459.
5. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108
S. Ct. 562 (1988). The district court stated that Reynolds told the group of student journalists
the articles were deleted because they were "too sensitive" for "our immature audience of
readers." 607 F. Supp. at 1459.
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their first amendment rights. The district court dismissed the plain-
tiffs' claims for injunctive relief, ruling that the students' graduation
rendered their claims moot.6
At trial,7 the principal testified that he deleted the two pages be-
cause of problems in two of the six articles which appeared on those
pages.8 One of the problem stories chronicled experiences three stu-
dents had during their pregnancies. The principal expressed concern
that the anonymous subjects of the story might be identified.9 The
other offending article discussed the impact of divorce upon students.
The principal thought it unfair that the author had not given the par-
ent of a student quoted in the article an opportunity to respond.' 0
The district court held that the defendants violated no first
amendment rights of the plaintiffs." A divided panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 2 The United
6. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 596 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
7. The district court bifurcated the issues of declaratory relief and liability from the issue
of damages, with the bench trial dealing solely with liability. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School
Dist., No. 83-2033C(l) (E.D. Mo. Nov. 8, 1984) (order and mem.).
8. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1459-60 (E.D. Mo. 1985),
rev'd, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). See supra note 3 and accom-
panying text.
9. A teacher at the school testified she could identify at least one and perhaps all three
girls. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 (1988). The district court
labeled the principal's concern over the loss of the girls' anonymity legitimate and reasonable.
The court based this conclusion on facts such as the small number of pregnant girls at the
1,800-student school and several identifying characteristics which were disclosed in the story.
Kuhlmeier, 607 F.. Supp. at 1466.
10. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 572. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. Un-
known to the principal, however, the faculty adviser had deleted the quoted student's name,
obviating the need for a response. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371
(8th Cir. 1986).
11. Kuhlmeier, 607 F. Supp. at 1467. The district court found that Spectrum was not a
public forum where content-based restrictions on free expression must be narrowly drawn to
effectuate compelling government interests. Spectrum was, instead, an integral part of the
school's curriculum and was not a public forum. Thus, the court concluded, school officials
could reasonably regulate the newspaper. Because Principal Reynolds reasonably censored the
newspaper, he did not violate the student's rights to free expression. Id. at 1465-66.
12. Kuhimeier, 795 F.2d 1368. Circuit Judge Heaney, for himself and Circuit Judge Ar-
nold, found Spectrum to be a public forum because the school intended the newspaper to be a
public forum and operated it as a conduit for student viewpoint. Because school officials
feared neither material disruption of classwork, substantial disorder, nor invasion of the rights
of others from the censored material, the censorship was improper. Id. at 1374-76. In his
dissent, Circuit Judge Wollman stated that the censorship was proper and adopted the reason-
ing of Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981) (school officials' banning performance of
school-sponsored musical upheld where musical was a part of the school's curriculum). For a
brief analysis of the Eighth Circuit's decision, viewing the opinion as a "strong protection of
students' first amendment rights," see Survey, Freedom of the Press-Censorship of High
School Newspaper Only Allowed if Tort Liability Could Result, 10 UALR L.J. 132, 133 (1987-
88).
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
States Supreme Court granted certiorari 13 and reversed the Eighth
Circuit in a five-to-three decision, holding that educators do not of-
fend the first amendment by censoring school-sponsored speech if the
censorship is reasonably related to educational concerns. Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
For more than three centuries, scholars have expounded upon a
free society's natural horror of censorship and the benefits of press
liberty. 4 Justice Brandeis stated that the nation's founders crafted
the first amendment because they "believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; . . . that it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repres-
sion; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government."' 5
The Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of the press, as
it appears in the first amendment, 16 has always meant, at the least, no
prior restraints on the press. 1" The Court has traditionally applied
stricter scrutiny on prior restraint of speech and press than it has on
subsequent punishment for speech.' 8 Prior restraints, the Court has
stated, are "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement" on
13. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 107 S. Ct. 926 (1987).
14. In 1644, Milton offered one of the first defenses of press liberty:
[Tihough all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be
in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.
Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and
open encounter.
J. MILTON, Aeropagitica: a speech of Mr. John Milton for the liberty of unlicenc'd printing, to
the Parliament of England, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 347 (F. Patterson, ed. 1931).
Utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote that the human race is robbed by censor-
ship and that the people who disagree with the censored opinion are the greater victims. "If
the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if
wrong, they lose ... the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error." J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 85 (H.B. Acton ed. 1984) (1859).
15. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (affirmed
conviction of Communist Labor Party organizer under California Criminal Syndicalism Act).
Brandeis's opinion "was labelled a 'concurrence' [but] it read like a dissent." J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.13 at 856 (3d ed. 1986).
16. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931), the Court stated that the prohibition
of prior restraints was the principal purpose of the first amendment's press protection. A prior
restraint is "any prohibition on the publication or communication of information prior to such
publication or communication." S. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 363 (2d ed. 1984).
18. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975) (city
improperly denied use of a municipal theater for showing the musical Hair).
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first amendment rights.'9 Justice White has stated that the same
speech for which a speaker may be constitutionally punished may
nonetheless be protected from prior restraint.2" Justifications for
prohibiting prior restraints21 include the difficulty of knowing in ad-
vance what an individual will say2 2 and the risk of uninhibited censor-
ship due to the delicate distinctions between protected and
unprotected speech.23
Approximately fifty years ago, the Supreme Court began to apply
the public forum doctrine to first amendment cases involving govern-
ment property.24 This doctrine is based upon the premise that the
first amendment affords significantly greater protection to expression
19. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (held improper a court order
restraining reporters from publishing prejudicial pretrial publicity).
20. E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring). The Court held unconstitutional prior restraints on newspapers which wanted to
publish a classified study on U.S. foreign policy-making in Vietnam. White stated that after
publication, the government could still proceed against the newspapers criminally.
21. The Court rarely feels a need to justify its rationale in imposing a heavier burden on
censorship than post-publication punishment. See, e.g., Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968) where the Court simply declared that the "impact
and consequences of subsequent punishment ... are materially different from those of prior
restraint."
22. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidated state law which authorized
injundiOns against malicious, scanalous and defamatory publ
23. The Court has stated that the "line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often
so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable." Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 559. Another difference between the effect of a prior restraint and
subsequent punishment is that where a prior restraint is obeyed, there is a loss in the immedi-
acy, and thus the impact, of the speech. See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61
(1975), quoted in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 609 (1976). "A prior restraint
... has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or
civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time."
Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559. "It is vital to the operation of democratic government
that the citizens have facts and ideas on important issues before them. A delay of even a day
or two may be of crucial importance in some instances." A Quantity of Copies of Books v.
Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (plurality decision struck down state
procedure for seizing obscene books). See generally Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of
the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply to Professor Mayton, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 283 (1982);
Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process. Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent
Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982);
Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L.
REV. 53 (1984).
24. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). See generally
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Stone,
Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 233; Note, Public Forum Analy-
sis After Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n-A Conceptual Approach to
Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 545
(1986).
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in public forums than it does to expression in nonpublic forums. 25
Government-held forums for expression fall into three types:
26
traditional public forums, such as streets and parks;2 designated pub-
lic forums which the government has opened for use by the public
28
for speech activity, such as auditoriums;29 and public properties
which are neither by tradition nor designation forums for public com-
munication, such as mailboxes.3 ° Generally, the government may im-
25. See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
26. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). In Perry,
the Court held that mailboxes maintained by the school for teachers were nonpublic forums
and therefore the school violated no first amendment rights of a rival union to the teachers'
bargaining agent by denying the rival union access to the mailboxes. In the decision, Justice
White attempted to clarify the public forum cases by constructing a three-level hierarchy of
publicly held forums where expression occurs. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
27. Places which are traditional public forums "have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, commu-
nicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague, 307 U.S. at 515
(dictum) quoted in Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)
(public sidewalks surrounding U.S. Supreme Court building); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 599-600 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring) (courtrooms, "[e]ven more
than city streets, sidewalks and parks" are an area of "traditional First Amendment Activ-
ity"); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (state capitol building and courthouse grounds).
28. The Perry Court noted that a designated public forum may be created for a limited
purpose, such as for use by student groups, or for the discussion of certain subjects. Perry, 460
U.S. at 46 n.7.
29. Municipal theaters and public auditoriums are examples of designated public forums.
Id. at 45-46. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university facilities generally
available to student groups); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)
(municipal theater).
Lower courts have often considered state-owned publications public forums or have
treated them as such without specifically mentioning the fact. In San Diego Comm. Against
Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd. of Grossment Union High School Dist., 790 F.2d
1471 (9th Cir. 1986), the court held that a school board had established a limited public forum
in its high school newspapers. Unless the board had a compelling reason to exclude speech
otherwise within the boundaries of the forum, the board could not censor the newspapers. The
court expressly applied the Perry analysis in finding that the board had created a public forum
by designation. San Diego Comm., 790 F.2d at 1474-78.
In Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973), a college president attempted to
withdraw funding from a student newspaper which advocated segregation. The court stated
that "if a college has a student newspaper, its publication cannot be suppressed [simply] be-
cause college officials dislike its editorial comments." Joyner, 477 F.2d at 460. The court
further found that the college could not censor constitutionally protected speech.
But see Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), where the court applied a
rational basis test in upholding censorship of two letters to the editor of a high school newspa-
per. This standard of scrutiny indicates the court did not find the paper to be a public forum.
30. The first amendment "does not guarantee access to property simply because it is
owned . . . by the government." United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (held as constitutional a prohibition against unstamped,
Imailable matter' in mailbox approved by U.S. Postal Service), cited in Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
See, e.g., Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
(1984) (upheld ordinance against posting of signs on street light posts because light posts are
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plement content-neutral restrictions regarding time, place, and
manner of speech in public forums a.3  Content-neutral restrictions,
however, must still be narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
mental interest, and they must leave open ample alternative means of
communications.3 2 Content-based restrictions on expression are per-
mitted in public forums only when there is a compelling governmental
justification.3" The same degree of scrutiny which applies to restric-
tions on speech in traditional public forums applies to restrictions on
speech in designated public forums.34 In nonpublic forums, the gov-
ernment may place reasonable restrictions on the freedom of
expression.35
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict, 6 the 1969 landmark 7 symbolic speech case, the Supreme Court
held that students have a right to free speech in public schools.3" The
not public forum); Minn. State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984)
(private meetings between academic administrators and teacher union representatives not a
public forum).
31. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. See, e.g., City of Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). The Court said some regulations of the manner
and time in which speeches could be delivered at a school board meeting are permissible.
However, the Court invalidated a state employment commission order which prohibited teach-
ers who are not union representatives from talking about contract negotiations at meetings
where the public can generally speak.
32. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 132).
33. "For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end." Id. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980) (selective exclusions from a
public forum may not be justified on content references alone)).
34. Id. at 46, where Justice White stated that the same standards of openness apply to
public forums created by tradition and by state designation. Justice White then stated, how-
ever, that designated public forums may be regulated by "reasonable" restrictions regarding
time, place, and manner. This would appear to be a lesser level of scrutiny than the "narrowly
tailored" standards he found applicable to similar restrictions in traditional public forums.
35. "In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the State may reserve the [non-
public] forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation
on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view." Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at
131 n.7).
36. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Court stated that school officials violated the first amend-
ment rights of public school students by suspending them from school for wearing armbands in
class to protest the Vietnam War. When school principals learned of the planned protest
before it occurred, they adopted a policy prohibiting armbands in school. Id. at 504. The
Court found that "[i]n the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to
regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views." Id. at 511.
37. "The starting point for any analysis of the first amendment rights of high school stu-
dents is Tinker ... Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir.
1986).
38. First amendment rights, "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students." 393 U.S. at 506.
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Court found that regulations limiting the free expression rights of stu-
dents are proper only if the regulations are aimed at behavior which
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or in-
vasion of the rights of others.
39
Because of the lack of Supreme Court decisions applying Tinker
over the next seventeen years, various circuit courts interpreted the
first amendment rights of high school students inconsistently. 4' The
Second Circuit read Tinker as requiring great deference to school offi-
cials in their practice of prior restraint4 and in determining what con-
stitutes a disruption for which punishment is permissible.42 The
Seventh Circuit, at the other extreme, read Tinker as generally
prohibiting school districts from practicing prior restraint.43 The
Fourth Circuit, falling between the Second and Seventh in its inter-
pretation of Tinker, presumed prior restraint by school officials to be
unconstitutional but permitted school censorship subject to clear reg-
ulations and adequate opportunities for students to appeal the offi-
cials' decision to censor." The First,4" Fifth,46 and Ninth47 Circuits
39. Id. at 513. The Court made plain that mere "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance" will not justify speech restrictions. Id. at 508. Any "departure from absolute
regimentation," any "variation from the majority's opinion," any "word spoken, in class, in
the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another" can cause
problems, but the Constitution "says we must take this risk." Id. This "hazardous freedom"
in our "relatively permissive" society is the basis of our national strength, independence, and
vigor. Id. at 508-09.
40. See generally Huffman & Trauth, High School Students' Publication Rights and Prior
Restraint, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 485 (1981); Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School
Press, 83 MICH. L. REv. 625 (1984).
41. In Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), the divided court held that the
school properly prevented the distribution in the school newspaper of a student survey which
solicited information regarding students' sexual practices because of the survey's potential for
invading the rights of others.
42. In Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971), the court invalidated
a school rule requiring materials which were to be distributed on the campus to be submitted
to school officials before hand, but said in dicta, "We do not agree ... that reasonable and fair
regulations which ... required prior submission of material for approval, would in all circum-
stances be an unconstitutional 'prior restraint.'" Id. at 805.
43. In Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1972), the court held
the school wrongly punished students for distributing an underground newspaper, noting that
Tinker should be used to determine only whether subsequent punishment for speech is proper.
44. In Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973), the court struck down a
school rule requiring prior submission of some materials to be distributed on campus, saying
the rule was vague, overbroad, and procedurally inadequate.
45. See Riseman v. School Comm. of Quincy, 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971), where the
court invalidated a school rule prohibiting the distribution of advertisements on school prop-
erty. The court declined to hold prior restraint invalid per se but said this restraint was invalid
because the school made no efforts to "minimize the adverse effect." Id. at 149.
46. See Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972) (prior
screening of student expression permitted "under clear and reasonable regulations").
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have generally followed this intermediate position, allowing school of-
ficials to practice prior restraint but subjecting such restraint to close
judicial scrutiny. The Eighth Circuit, in a footnote to Kuhlmeier,
cited each of the three major positions on school censorship, but indi-
cated that it would follow a moderate path.48 In 1987, the Eighth
Circuit cited the same footnote for the position that the Eighth Cir-
cuit has "clearly rejected the view that prior restraints are per se un-
constitutional in the high-school context."49
From 1970 through the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court did not
consider the free speech rights of high school students.50 The Court's
first post-Tinker decision involving the right of high school students
to free expression came in the 1986 case of Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser.5 The Fraser Court held that a school may punish a
student who gives a "lewd" speech52 at a school assembly; that a high
school student's free speech rights are not "automatically coextensive
47. See Nicholson v. Board of Educ. Torrance School Dist., 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir.
1982) (in dicta, said high school journalists' right to be free from pre-publication review is not
"unfettered").
48. "[T]he Tinker standards are to be applied whenever administrators can reasonably
predict that the content of a student publication will violate the Tinker standard. Of course, if
student writings are to be censored prior to publication, the least restrictive means are to be
followed." Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1374 n.5 (8th Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988) (citations omitted).
49. Bystrom v. Fridley High School Indep. School Dist. No. 14, 822 F.2d 747, 750 (8th
Cir. 1987) (citing Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1374 n.5). The court upheld a high school's policy
permitting prior review and prior restraint of an underground student newspaper on campus.
The court favorably cited the Second Circuit's position on prior restraints in Eisner v. Stam-
ford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971). Bystrom, 822 F.2d at 751. However,
Circuit Judge Arnold, writing for the three-member Eighth Circuit panel, cautioned that the
court "held only that the [school's] policy... is not unconstitutional on its face." Id. at 755.
He wrote that if the policy is wrongly applied to constitutionally protected speech, courts will
hear students' complaints and the burden will be on the school administrators to justify their
actions. Id.
50. Note, supra note 40. But see Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist.
No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), in which the Supreme Court considered the extent to
which the first amendment limits schools from banning books from high school and junior
high school libraries. In Justice Brennan's plurality decision, the Court found that students
have a right to receive ideas. Thus, the local school board was not allowed to remove books
from library shelves simply because it disliked the ideas contained in the books.
51. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
52. Justice Brennan, concurring in Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court, set out
the text of Matthew N. Fraser's nominating speech for a friend seeking student government
office:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his
character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll
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with the rights of adults in other settings;" 53 and that the school
board should decide what manner of speech in classrooms or school
assemblies is proper.54
The Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the trial court's award of
damages to the student who gave the speech in Fraser, held that the
speech was indistinguishable from the protest armband at issue in
Tinker." The Supreme Court in Fraser said that there was an impor-
tant difference between the political message of the armbands in
Tinker and the sexual content of the speech in Fraser.56 The Court
stated that the punishment of the student in Fraser was proper be-
cause the school needed to disassociate itself from the vulgar speech
which was inconsistent with school values.
7
The next opportunity for the Court to reconsider Tinker came
just eighteen months after Fraser. In Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,58 Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that the
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives
hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every
one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the
best our high school can be.
Id. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Dissenting, Justice Stevens noted the speech contained no obscene or profane language.
Id. at 3171 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that the honor student delivering
the speech was probably better situated to determine its offensiveness than "a group of judges
who are at least two generations and 3,000 miles away from the scene of the crime." Id. at
3169. Supporting Stevens's contentions was the finding by the Ninth Circuit that there "is no
evidence in the record indicating that any students found the speech to be offensive." Fraser v.
Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1361 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3159
(1986).
53. 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
54. Id. at 3165.
55. Fraser, 755 F.2d 1356, cited in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159,
3163 (1986).
56. 106 S. Ct. at 3163. Dissenting, Justice Marshall said that there was a lack of evidence
to convince either of the two lower courts that education at Bethel School was disrupted by the
speech; therefore, Tinker prohibited the punishment of the student. Id. at 3168-69 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 3166. There is general agreement that the decision expanded the rights of
school officials to regulate student speech, but there is a sharp disagreement on whether the
expansion was proper. Compare Note, Mathew Fraser Sheds His Constitutional Rights to Free-
dom of Speech at the Schoolhouse Gates, 20 AKRON L. REV. 563 (1987) (concluding that
school officials need leeway to regulate student speech in order to maintain discipline in the
schools) with Note, Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools-Fraser v.
Bethel School District Revisited, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 473 (1986) (concluding that instead of more
discretion, what school officials need is better judgment and clear statements of first amend-
ment principles to protect the young as well as the old).
58. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
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case concerned the extent of editorial control educators may exercise
over a student newspaper which is part of the school's curriculum.59
Justice White began his analysis by citing Justice Fortas's oft-quoted
statement from Tinker that public school students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate."' Justice White stated that Tinker must be viewed today
in the context of the Court's Fraser6' opinion, in which five justices
agreed that "[n]othing in the Constitution prohibits the states from
insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and sub-
ject to sanctions.
62
The Court found that Spectrum, the Hazelwood East High
School newspaper, was not a public forum.63 School facilities consti-
tute public forums only if school authorities have opened the facilities
"for indiscriminate use by the general public" ' or some segment of
the public, such as student organizations. 65 The Court said Spectrum
amounted to a laboratory situation and part of the school's curricu-
lum. 66 Further, school officials had always exerted pre-publication re-
view and a great deal of control over the paper. 67 The Court termed
"equivocal at best" the evidence relied on by the Eighth Circuit in
finding the newspaper to be a public forum.6  The school did not
59. Id. at 565.
60. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969),
quoted in Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 567.
61. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
62. Id. at 3165. Justice White stated that comments in Justice Black's unjoined dissent in
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515, were "especially relevant" to the analysis in Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at
570 n.4 (citing Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166).
63. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569.
64. Id. at 568 (citing Perry Education Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 47 (1983)).
65. Id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 47 n.7).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The Eighth Circuit cited a school board policy and Spectrum's statement of policy
as evidence that the school intended to create a public forum. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School
Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (8th Cir. 1986). The school board policy, which stated that
student publications would not "restrict free expression or diverse viewpoints within the rules
of responsible journalism," also stated that the publications were "developed within the
adopted curriculum and its educational implications." Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569. Spec-
trum's Statement of Policy declared that the newspaper "accepts all rights implied" by the first
amendment. Id. The Statement of Policy also said that only speech which materially and
substantially interferes with school discipline "can be found unacceptable and therefore be
prohibited." Id. at 569 n.2. At most, the Court wrote, this suggests school officials will not
interfere with rights which attend the publication of a school-sponsored newspaper, but does
not "reflect an intent to expand those rights by converting a curricular newspaper into a public
forum." Id. at 569.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
create a public forum,69 the Court stated, because school officials did
not clearly intend to create a public forum.70
The Court identified two types of student speech at public
schools: (1) "personal expression that happens to occur on the school
premises ' ' 7 and (2) school-sponsored expression.12 The level of judi-
cial scrutiny of school regulation of student speech depends on which
of the two types of speech is at issue.73
Speech of the first type, where a student expresses his personal
views at school, is still accorded the Tinker level of scrutiny.74 Tinker
would bar an education official's attempt to silence a student for per-
sonal expression on campus 75 unless the personal expression materi-
ally disrupts classwork, involves substantial disorder, or invades the
rights of others.76
Speech of the second type, expressive activity sponsored by the
school, is subject to a different analysis.7 7 School officials may regu-
late school-sponsored speech for any valid educational purpose.7 8
This increased power of censorship is justified for three reasons:
(1) to ensure that students learn what they are supposed to learn;
(2) to ensure that students are not exposed to material which may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity; and (3) to ensure that people
do not confuse the views of the students with the views of the
school.79
School-sponsored speech, according to the Court, includes
school newspapers and yearbooks, school plays and musicals, and
69. Kulmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569.
70. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985)). In Cornelius, the Court determined that a federal government employee charity drive
did not constitute a public forum. Critical to the analysis, the Court said, is intent to open a
nontraditional forum for public discourse. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. To determine that the
government intended to create a public forum, the Court has looked to the policy and practice
of the government, as well as the "nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive
activity." Id.
71. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
72. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
73. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570-71.
74. Id. at 567 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509). See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
75. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569.
76. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
77. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570.
78. Id. at 571. "[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercis-
ing editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expres-
sive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns." Id.
79. Id. at 570.
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other student activities which people might reasonably think are au-
thorized by the school.8" The Court will allow judicial intervention to
protect a student's first amendment right to free speech in connection
with such school-sponsored expressive activities only when the cen-
sorship decision lacks a valid educational purpose.8 The Court found
this standard consistent with its view that education is primarily the
responsibility of parents, teachers, and school officials, and not of fed-
eral judges.8 2
The Court found that the principal acted reasonably in deleting
two pages from the May 13, 1983, issue of Spectrum. Thus, the Court
held that no violation of first amendment rights occurred.8 3 The prin-
cipal reasonably concluded that frank talk in the pregnancy article 4
was inappropriate for 14-year-old freshmen and the students' younger
siblings who might read the paper.8 5 Further, the principal reason-
ably thought that journalistic fairness required a response from a per-
son whom he thought had been identified as an inattentive parent 86 in
the article on divorce.
8 7
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
wrote a stinging dissent, explaining that the case should have started
and ended with a Tinker analysis. 8 The dissenters stated that the
80. Id. at 569.
81. Id. at 571.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 572.
84. The girl identified by the pseudonym "Terri" in the censored pregnancy article offered
the most straightforward talk on the subject of her sexual experience. She was quoted as
saying: "I had no pressures (to have sex). It was my own decision. We were going out four or
five months before we had sex." Brief for the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Amici
Curiae, in Support of Affirmance at 19, A-3, Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct.
562 (1988) (No. 86-836).
85. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571-72. But see Reply Brief for Petitioners at 17, Hazelwood
School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988) (No. 86-836) (Hazelwood School District said
that the youngest Spectrum readers were 14).
86. A student who the principal thought had been named in the article provided this
quote: "My dad wasn't spending enough time with my mom, my sister and I. He was always
out of town on business or out late playing cards with the guys. My parents always argued
about everything .... In the beginning I thought I caused the problem, but now I realize[d] it
wasn't me." Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1376 (8th Cir. 1986).
87. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 572. The principal was unaware the faculty adviser had
already deleted the identifying name in the proofs which were to be returned to the printer. Id.
at 566. Underlying the censorship of the divorce article was the Hazelwood School District
officials' belief that "divorce is per se an inappropriate subject for high school newspapers."
795 F.2d at 1376.
88. The dissent contended that the majority "denudes high school students of much of the
First Amendment protection that Tinker itself prescribed." Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 580
(Brennan, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the majority teaches "youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes." Id. (citing W. Va. State Bd. of
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Court had never before made a distinction between personal and
school-sponsored speech.8 9
Justice Brennan wrote that none of the three "excuses" the ma-
jority used' to justify its decision to grant officials greater censorship
powers over school-sponsored speech justified the distinction9 be-
tween the two types of student speech.92 First, Tinker addresses the
right of school officials to control the curriculum. 93 Second, Justice
Brennan stated that shielding high school students from exposure to
potentially sensitive topics or unacceptable social viewpoints is an ille-
gitimate exercise of school authority. 94 Finally, Brennan found that
the school's legitimate concern that people might erroneously attri-
bute the views of the individual speaker to the school can be alleviated
through means less oppressive than "brutal censorship."9'
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1945)). The majority's permitting censorship of some
student speech for "mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message" could con-
vert "our public schools into 'enclaves of totalitarianism.' " Id. at 574 (citing Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
89. Id. at 575 (citing Papish v. Univ. of Mo. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per
curiam) and Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)). In Papish, the Court stated that university
officials violated the first amendment rights of a student expelled for printing the headline,
"Mother-Fucker Acquitted." The headline was over an article in a newspaper sold on campus
pursuant to university authorization. The story was about the trial of a member of an organi-
zation known as "Up Against the Wall, Mother-Fucker." In Healy the Court stated that a
college president violated the first amendment rights of members of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) by refusing official recognition of the group. One of the benefits of such recogni-
tion, the Court noted, would be access to the pages of the school newspaper for SDS announce-
ments. 408 U.S. at 176. Justice Brennan pointed out that in both of these cases, the Court
relied heavily on Tinker, and found each act of suppression unconstitutional, despite the fact
that each involved school-sponsored speech. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 575-76 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
90. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
91. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569-70. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
92. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 576 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. Under the Tinker standard, the school can discipline "the budding political orator
if he disrupts calculus class but not if he holds his tongue for the cafeteria." Id. Justice Bren-
nan stated that such a result is not because a more stringent standard of control occurs in
curricular activities, but because student speech outside curricular activities is less likely to
disrupt the work of the school. Therefore, Justice Brennan stated, "[W]e need not abandon
Tinker.. .; we need only apply it." Id.
94. Id. at 577. While it is the school's place to instill moral and political values, Brennan
wrote, the school has no license to act as " 'thought police' stifling discussion of all but state-
approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position." Id. The state, even in its capac-
ity as educator, "may not assume an Orwellian 'guardianship of the public mind.' " Id. (citing
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
95. Id. at 579. Justice Brennan offered two examples of less-oppressive means for a school
to disassociate itself from student speech. First, a school could publish a disclaimer, such as
the "Statement of Policy" which appeared in Spectrum each year announcing that "editorials
appearing in this newspaper reflect the opinions of the Spectrum staff, which are not necessar-
ily shared by the administrators or faculty of Hazelwood East . I..." Id. Alternately, the
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Applying the Tinker analysis to the censored articles in Spec-
trum, Justice Brennan found the censorship invalid because the arti-
cles neither prevented material disruption of classwork nor invaded
any rights of others which were protected by law.9 6 Justice Brennan
concluded by contending that even if the principal could legitimately
censor, he should have done it in a fashion other than the one he
used. 97
The Supreme Court indicates through Kuhimeier that while stu-
dents may bring their constitutional rights into the schoolyard, those
rights will derive from a constitution which folds and sags at school.
A student's right to free expression will be a right defined by a princi-
pal or a school board, not the Constitution. The Kuhimeier holding
follows the theory put forth in another leading student rights case
decided by the Court recently, New Jersey v. T.L.0.98 The TL.O.
majority, through Justice White, told school officials they could in-
trude upon students' privacy rights without worrying about the "nice-
ties of probable cause." 99
The significance of the Supreme Court's sweeping grant of cen-
sorship powers to state and local education officials stretches far be-
yond the boundaries of East Hazelwood High School, or even student
newspaper offices across the nation."c° The decision seems to affect
school could issue "its own response clarifying the official position on the matter and explain-
ing why [the school finds] the student position is wrong." Id.
96. Id. The Kuhlmeier majority expressly reserved judgment on the issue of whether
Tinker, which permits school officials to censor student speech which invades the rights of
others, only refers to rights recognized by tort law. Id. at 570 n.5. The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded the rights of others which give rise to permissible school censorship are
limited to rights recognized by law: "Any yardstick less exacting than [that] could result in
school officials curtailing speech at the slightest fear of disturbance." Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood
School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1376 (8th Cir. 1986), quoted in Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 579
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the invasion-of-rights component of
Tinker relied heavily on Note, supra note 40.
97. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 579-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Where '[t]he separation of
legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools,' the principal used a paper
shredder." Id. at 580 (citations omitted). The principal "objected to . . . material in two
articles, but excised six entire articles. He did not so much as inquire into obvious alternatives,
such as precise deletions or additions ... , rearranging the layout, or delaying publication." Id.
98. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (a vice principal's search of a student's purse was proper after
student violated school rule against smoking cigarettes in the bathroom).
99. Id. at 343.
100. The opinion, perhaps because of its particular concern to the news media, received
much attention, including front-page newspaper articles. See, e.g., Schools Get Right to Censor,
Ark. Democrat, Jan. 14, 1988, at IA, col. 2; Byrd, Arkansas Student Press Surprised at Court
Censorship Powers Ruling, Baxter Bull., Jan. 14, 1988, at IA, col. 1. In Court to Student
Editors: Teacher Knows Best, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 25, 1988, at 10, the magazine
predicts that the "ruling ... could return student papers and even school plays to an era of
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not only all student newspapers 0 1 but school theatrical produc-
tions'02 and other expressive activities sponsored by the school.
103
The Court said school officials could legitimately censor a wide range
of expression, offering examples ranging from speech concerning "the
existence of Santa Clause" to "any position other than neutrality on
matters of political controversy.'
The Court left open the possibility that the reasonableness stan-
dard for censorship review could eventually extend to the college and
university press-including law journals. The majority ominously
noted, "[w]e need not now decide whether the same degree of defer-
ence is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activi-
ties at the college and university level."'
l0 5
Many school officials practice censorship, according to over-
whelming evidence. !° 6 One scholar offered as a reason for the broad
censorship in schools the problem that judicial review of censorship
decisions occurs only when the relatively powerless student has the
courage and the money to challenge the powerful school censor. 07
Because Kuhlmeier greatly increases the school administrator's free-
dom to censor, a dramatic increase in student self-censorship and stu-
dent cynicism regarding the first amendment could develop into the
blandness." See also Garneau, A 'First Amendment Disaster,' EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 16,
1988, at 12, in which Jane Kirtley, director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, said the decision extends blank-check censorship over school-sponsored communication:
"For the high school press this is a very dark day."
101. "[A]il student newspapers financed and supervised by the public schools would seem
to come under the new ruling, not only those that are produced as part of a journalism curricu-
lum." Seligmann, A Limit on the Student Press-Now It's All the News that Fits the Principal,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25, 1988, at 60.
102. But cf Court to Student Editors: Teacher Knows Best, supra note 100 (students in a
Portland, Ore., high school cite state law in their challenge of the deletion of supposedly pro-
fane phrases from a student production of John Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men).
103. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570. "A school must be able to set high standards for the
student speech that is disseminated under its auspices ... and may refuse to disseminate stu-
dent speech that does not meet those standards." Id.
104. Id. A "school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the in-
tended audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive
topics ...." Id. Cf. Fowler, Teachers, Students React to Decision on School Papers, Ark.
Democrat, Jan. 14, 1988, at 7A, col. 5, in which a Northeast High School journalism teacher
in North Little Rock is quoted: "We're telling them that certain topics are not proper for
them to write about. These are things that affect students, and they can't even write about
them. What are they supposed to be concerned with-fashion?"
105. 108 S. Ct. at 571 n.7.
106. In 1986, the Student Press Law Center received 551 requests for legal advice and
assistance. Brief of Student Press Law Center, as Amici Curiae, in Support of Respondents at
19, Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988) (No. 86-836). See also infra notes 107-08, 110.
107. See Letwin, Administrative Censorship of the Independent Student Press-Demise of
the Double Standard?, 28 S.C.L. REV. 565, 581 (1977).
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decision's greatest evil. 108
Traditionally, the Court has approved censorship actions by the
state only with the most delicate, limiting language it can find."° But
Justice White, by stressing the importance of the nonpublic forum
doctrine to the Court's decision, painted the right to censor in
Kuhlmeier with the broadest brush available without expressly over-
ruling Tinker."l0 The Kuhimeier Court, using its nonpublic forum
analysis, could find that no right exists for a student to wear a protest
armband to class if his school has banned from school all symbols of
political or controversial significance."' Such an approach trans-
forms Tinker into a public forum decision, not a decision about free
expression rights of students. The approach ensures against the ap-
pearance of a Tinker case before the Court again, thus encouraging
more school censorship and less student expression. The Court ele-
vated the educational goals of discipline and conformity above goals
such as robust discussion and independent thinking.
Kuhlmeier means that student journalists must consider new ap-
proaches to publishing stories that school censors may disfavor."12
The censored Hazelwood articles, which the principal and Supreme
108. For an in-depth look at the problems created by school censorship, see CAPTIVE
VOICES, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO HIGH SCHOOL JOURNALISM
(1974). The evidence indicated that most high school press censorship focuses on controver-
sial political issues, criticism of school employees or school policies, and social problems. Id.
at 41.
109. Even where the state abridgement of free speech is legitimate, involving a substantial
governmental interest, the government must use the least restrictive means possible to achieve
that purpose. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (striking down Arkansas statute
requiring teachers to list all organizations to which they belonged or contributed in the previ-
ous five years).
110. Justice White depended much more upon the language in Bethel School Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) than he did on Tinker. However, this was unnecessary since
Fraser is distinguishable from Kuhlmeier in three key respects: in Fraser, punishment occurred
after speech which was said to be vulgar and which was delivered to, in some respects, a captive
audience. In Kuhlmeier, the state action came prior to publication and involved neither vulgar
speech nor a captive audience.
I 11. Tinker could be distinguished by the Kuhlmeier Court by pointing out that in the Des
Moines public schools that John Tinker attended, principals allowed students to wear national
political campaign buttons and the Iron Cross, a symbol of Nazi Germany. Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969). Thus, the Court could say,
the school created a limited public forum for the purposes of wearing political symbols in class.
112. Thomas J. Engleman, executive director of the Dow Jones Newspaper Fund, said in
reaction to Kuhlmeier that alternative expression may become increasingly important, citing
such examples as the Youth News Service sponsored by Youth Communication of Washing-
ton, youth pages in local newspapers, computerized networks for students to transmit their
stories to other publications, and publication and distribution of student newspapers by local
daily newspapers. Supreme Court Authorizes Student Press Censorship, PRESSTIME, Feb. 1988,
at 44. Newsweek quoted New York lawyer Alan Levine, author of The Rights of Students, as
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Court agreed were produced by students who had not sufficiently
mastered necessary parts of the journalism curriculum, were eventu-
ally published in their entirety in a major daily newspaper."13 Obvi-
ously, most student-written articles will not raise enough public
attention for this sort of treatment. Desktop publishing coupled with
a spotty tradition of underground newspapers on school campuses
could give student journalists an alternative beyond the reach of
school censors." 4 But the incentive for such a self-help alternative
may be missing for students who wish to practice uncensored speech
in traditional school activities such as theatrical productions or debate
clubs. The Court's grant of censorship powers may be too broad for
expressive students to escape.
Charles William Burton
saying, "The [student] papers will be more orthodox and bland. The only alternative will be
leaflets and an underground press." Seligmann, supra note 101.
113. Too Hot for Hazelwood, St. Louis Globe Democrat, Feb. 9, 1985, (Weekend Section),
at 5.
114. A week after the Kuhlmeier ruling, students in Evergreen High School in Los Ange-
les, who had been wrangling with their principal over heavy administrative editing of a story
on rock lyrics and the banning of a survey on sexual attitudes, published an underground
version of what had been a school-sponsored paper. Students Opposed to Supreme Court Rul-
ing Publish Underground Paper, The Associated Press, Jan. 20, 1988, at a0797 (AM-Under-
ground Paper).
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